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UNITED STATES v. VOGEL FERTILIZER CO.:
SUPREME COURT PAVES THE WAY FOR
AVOIDANCE OF BROTHER-SISTER
CONTROLLED GROUP STATUS
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary federal income tax advantages of operating in the
multicorporate form are the availability of multiple surtax exemptions'
and multiple accumulated earnings credits.2 The large enterprise able
to structure its corporate form so as to operate numerous corporations
without constituting a "controlled group" may divide its total income
among its various corporate entities and thereby lower its effective tax
rate.3
The device known as the "controlled group" has been the primary
weapon employed by Congress in its attempts to limit the availability
of unintended tax benefits to multicorporate entities.4 Section 1561(a)
1. See Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 121(a), 64 Stat. 915 (repealed 1978) (formerly
codified at I.R.C. § 11(c) (1976)).
Congress repealed the surtax and surtax exemption in 1978 and instituted the graduated
rate structure presently in effect. See infra note 34.
2. See I.R.C. § 535(c) (1981). A corporation that unreasonably accumulates earnings
and profits in order to avoid the dividend tax on its shareholders is subject to a penalty tax
on the amount of income unreasonably accumulated. A corporation is presently entitled to
accumulate $250,000 without being subject to accumulated earnings tax.
3. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(1) (1981) limits members of a controlled group of corporations to a
single benefit under the graduated rate brackets contained in § 11 (b).
Under the tax rates effective for 1983, the use of multiple corporations will produce an
annual tax savings of $20,250 for each additional corporation with taxable income of at least
$100,000. (For example, a group of five related corporations that fail to constitute a "con-
trolled group" can achieve an annual tax savings of up to $81,000. Under the tax rates
effective for 1983, a corporation with taxable income in excess of $100,000 pays tax on the
excess at the rate of 46%. However, the corporation pays tax on the first $100,000 at gradu-
ated rates that result in an effective rate of 25.75%, thereby accounting for the savings of
$20,250 for each additional corporation that is not in a controlled group.)
4. See infra text accompanying notes 34-54, setting forth the origin of the controlled
group legislation. The issue addressed in Vogel relates only to the definition of a brother-
sister controlled group.
A parent-subsidiary controlled group is defined as one or more chains of corporations
connected through stock ownership with a common parent corporation if one or more cor-
porations owns at least 80% of each corporation (except the parent), and the common parent
corporation owns at least 80% of at least one of the other corporations in the group. I.R.C.
§ 1563(a)(1) (1976).
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of the Internal Revenue Code5 was enacted in 19646 to limit a "con-
trolled group of corporations" to a single corporate surtax exemption
7
and a single accumulated earnings credit. 8 Thus, two or more corpora-
tions found to be a "controlled group" will be taxed as a single entity.
The definition of a "brother-sister controlled group" formulated
under the Tax Reform Act of 19699 gave rise to a prolonged contro-
versy which was resolved when the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered its decision in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. lO That
definition, contained in section 1563(a)(2), sets forth a two-pronged
control test:
Brother-sister controlled group-Two or more corporations if
5 orfewerpersons . . . own. . . stock possessing-
(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the
total value of shares of all classes of the stock of each corpora-
tion, and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50
percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of
each corporation, taking into account the stock of each such
person only to the extent such stock ownership is identical
with respect to each such corporation."
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the term "brother-
sister controlled group" to mean two or more corporations if the same
five or fewer persons own "singly or in combination" the two prescribed
percentages of voting power or value.' 2
5. Hereinafter referred to as "the Code" or by section number. All references herein
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
6. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19, 116-25 (1964).
7. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(1) (1981).
8. Id at § 1561(a)(2) (1981).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
10. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
11. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
12. In Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 291, 300-01, the Commis-
sioner interpreted § 1563(a)(2) as follows:
(3) Brother-sister controlled group-(i) The term "brother-sister controlled
group" means two or more corporations if the same five or fewer persons who are
individuals, estates, or trusts own (directly and with the application of the rules
contained in paragraph (b) of § 1.1563-3), singly or in combination, stock possess-
ing-
(a) At least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes
of stock of each corporation; and
(b) More than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
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The proper application of the eighty percent test ultimately be-
came an issue which divided the circuits and provoked controversy
among legal commentators.1 3 The issue addressed by the Court in Vo-
stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock of each corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of
each such person only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect
to each such corporation.
(ii) The principles of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the fol-
lowing examples:
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q, R, S, and T, which
have only one class of stock outstanding, is owned by the following unrelated
individuals:
Identical
Individuals Corporations Ownership
P Q R S T
A .... 60% 60% 60% 60% 100% 60%
B .... 40% - - - - -
C.... - 40% -..
D .... - 40% - - -
E .... - - - 40% - -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60%
Corporations P, Q, R, S, and T are members of a brother-sister controlled group.
Example (2). The outstanding stock of corporations U and V, which hive
only one class of stock outstanding, is owned by the following unrelated
individuals:
Identical
Individuals Corporations Ownership
U V
F .................... 5% - -
G .................... 10%
H .................... 10% - -
I ..................... 20% - -
J .................... 55% 55% 55%
K .................... - 10% -
L .................... - 10% -
M ................... - 10% -
N .................... - 10% -
0 .................... - 5% -
Total 100% 100% 55%
Corporations U and V are not members of a brother-sister controlled group be-
cause at least 80 percent of the stock of each corporation is not owned by the same
5 or fewer persons.
13. See Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Section 1563: The 80 Percent
Ownersho Test, 28 TAx LAWYER 511 (1975); Kringel, Multiple corporation Proposed Regula-
tions raise more questions than they answer, 36 J. TAX'N 358 (1972); Libin and Abramowitz,
Multple Corporations." 4 surprising interpretation of Sec. 1563(a) (2) in temporary regulations,
3 TAx ADVISER 326 (1971); Thomas, Brother-Sister Multiple Corporations-The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAX L. REv. 65 (1972); Note, Disallowance ofSurtax
Exemption to Brother-Sister Corporation Stock Ownershp Test under Sections 1551 and 1563,
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gel was whether the statutory definition is satisfied if the "5 or fewer
persons" own the stock "singly or in combination" as contended by the
Commissioner pursuant to the governing Treasury regulations, or
whether each person whose stock is to be taken into account must own
stock in each corporation of the group.
The Court adopted the position advocated by numerous taxpayers
and consistently applied by the Tax Court, 14 holding that the eighty
percent test of section 1563(a)(2) excludes the stockholdings of a person
who does not own an interest in each of the corporations in the alleged
controlled group.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit16 and the United States Court of Claims'7 in the decision below
had also adopted this position. By so holding, the Vogel Court rejected
the Commissioner's position that the eighty percent test does not im-
pose a common ownership requirement. This position had been up-
held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second,' 8 Fourth '
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1000, 1017 (1976); Note, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Basic Eighty
Percent Stock Ownership Test as Control 58 TEx. L. REV. 1161 (1980); Note, The Brother-
Sister Controlled Group Under LAC § L563(a)(2), 67 VA. L. REV. 751 (1981). But see
White, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Demise of Multoile Surtax Exemptions-W'en Too
Much of a Good Thing Proved Its Own Undoing, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1353 (1970).
14. The Tax Court first invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1563-1(a)(3) in a decision reviewed by
the full court with four judges dissenting. Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
798 (1976), rev'dper curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). The
Tax Court followed its Fairfax decision in T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-
H) 952 (1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Charles Baloian Co. v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 620 (1977), af'dmenz, (9th Cir. 1982); Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 47
T.C.M. (P-H) 1473 (1978), aff-d, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 906
(1982); Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 348 (1979), rev'd, 614 F.2d 336 (2d
Cir. 1980); Davidson Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 1598 (1979).
In Delta Meta//orming Judge Drennen stated that until the Supreme Court resolved the
issue, the Tax Court would continue to maintain the position it established in Fairfax, de-
spite reversals of that decision by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 1473,
1477 (1978). The Tax Court continued to maintain that the regulation was invalid, however,
where bound by the rule established in Golsen v. Commissioner, it was forced to follow the
precedent established by the Court of Appeals in the Circuit to which a case would be ap-
pealed. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). See, e.g., Dixie Realty Co.. 49 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1321 (1980). (Tax Court maintained that regulation was invalid but followed Eighth
Circuit decision in TL. Hunt holding to the contrary because the case was appealable to that
circuit under Golsen.)
15. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
16. Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. granted, 450
U.S. 994 (1981). The Court of Claims was restructured in 1982 and is now the United States
Claims Court. Pub. L. 97-164, § 105(a), 96 Stat. 27 (1982). See infra note 72.
18. Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980).
19. Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 904 (1977).
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and Eighth2" Circuits.
The Vogel Court concluded that any ambiguity in the language of
section 1563(a)(2) was resolved by the legislative history, making it
plain that the Commissioner's regulation was "not a reasonable statu-
tory interpretation."'2 ' This note will consider whether the legislative
history relied on by the Court does in fact neatly resolve the statutory
ambiguity and plainly render the regulation an unreasonable statutory
interpretation. In addition, this note will consider whether the Court's
decision is supported by the legislative history when the results of the
decision are viewed in light of Congress' intent to broaden the defini-
tion of a brother-sister controlled group when it enacted the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969. This note will also examine the effects of the
decision upon other areas of the tax law beyond the specific issue of the
multiple surtax exemption addressed by the Court in Vogel.22 Finally,
this note will conclude that the Vogel Court relied primarily upon am-
biguous statutory language and legislative history, which led the Court
to reach a result not entirely consistent with the aims Congress sought
to achieve through enactment of section 1563(a)(2) in 1969. Inasmuch
as the regulation is neither unreasonable nor plainly inconsistent with
the statute, the Court should have deferred to the judgment of the
Commissioner and upheld the validity of the regulation.
2 3
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arthur Vogel owned 77.49% of the outstanding stock of the tax-
20. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Yaffe Iron & Metal
Corp. v. United States, 593 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979).
21. 455 U.S. at 26.
22. The issue of controlled group status is relevant in a host of other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code: See, e.g., §§ 804(a)(3) (1976) and 809(d)(10) (1976) (limitation on
small business deduction of life insurance companies); §§ 404(a)(1)(c) (1976) and 414(b)
(1981) (deductions by employers for contributions to stock bonus, revision, profit-sharing or
annuity plans); § 58(b) (1981) (apportionment of exemption from minimum tax); § 179(d)(7)
(1981) (limitation on expensing of depreciable property); § 48(c)(2)(C) (1981) (cost of used
property eligible for investment credit); and § 465(c)(4)(C) (1981) (at-risk limitations).
The Service has also taken the position that employees of controlled corporations who
perform substantial services for all of the corporations will be considered employees of each
of the corporations for purposes of FICA, FUTA and federal income tax withholding, even
if the employee is compensated by only one of the corporations. See Rev. Rul. 73-162, 1973-
1 C.B. 417, ampflledby Rev. Rul. 74-390, 1974-2 C.B. 331.
23. Legislation was introduced in the Ninety-seventh Congress to amend § 1563(a)(2) so
that the 80% test would continue to limit the control group to five shareholders, but would
not impose a common ownership requirement. This legislation was not enacted. H.R. 6725,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See infra note 135 and acompanying text.
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payer, Vogel Fertilizer Company, an Iowa corporation engaged in the
business of selling farm fertilizer products at retail to local customers.
An unrelated shareholder, Richard Crain, owned the remaining 22.51%
of the company's outstanding stock. Vogel also held 87.5% of the vot-
ing power, and between 90.66% and 93.42% of the value of the stock of
Vogel Popcorn Company, an Iowa corporation engaged in the business
of selling popcorn in the wholesale and retail markets. Crain owned no
stock in Vogel Popcorn Company.24
Vogel's interest in each company clearly satisfied the fifty percent
test of section 1563(a)(2)(B). 25 However, his holdings in Vogel Ferti-
lizer fell below the eighty percent requirement contained in part A of
the statute. Under section 1.1563-1(a)(3) of the regulations, Vogel Fer-
tilizer and Vogel Popcorn constituted a controlled group since Crain's
stock could be counted toward the eighty percent test, despite the fact
that Crain owned no stock in Vogel Popcorn. Vogel Fertilizer treated
itself and Vogel Popcorn as members of a brother-sister controlled
group for the tax years 1973 through 1975 under the belief that the
regulations required such treatment.26 However, following a 1976 Tax
Court decision invalidating the controversial regulation," the taxpayer
changed its position and filed timely claims for refund.28 When the
Internal Revenue Service disallowed the claims, the taxpayer sued for
a refund in the United States Court of Claims.29 The court held that
Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn did not constitute a brother-sister
24. 455 U.S. at 19-21. The remainder of the Vogel Popcorn Company stock was voting
preferred stock owned by Vogel as trustee of the Alex Vogel Family Trust. Vogel is not
deemed to own this stock for tax purposes under the attribution rules of§ 1563(d)(2) and (e).
Id at 21 & n.4.
25. The application of the 50% test contained in subparagraph (B) of § 1563(a)(2) is
straightforward. The 50% test takes into account a shareholder's ownership only to the ex-
tent that the shareholder's ownership is identical in each corporation tested. If X owns 30%
of ABC Corporation and has no ownership interest in XYZ Corporation, X's identical own-
ership is zero. If, however, X owns 70% of ABC Corporation and 40% of XYZ Corporation,
and Y owns 20% of each corporation, the 50% test is satisfied. In this example, the identical
ownership of individual X is 40%, and that of individual Y is 20%, for a total identical
ownership in excess of 50%.
26. 455 U.S. at 21 & n.5. For 1973 and 1974 Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn elected
the option of claiming separate surtax exemptions and paying the multiple surtax penalty
imposed by § 1562(b). This option was phased out with the enactment of § 1564 in 1969.
Vogel Fertilizer elected to allocate the single surtax exemption to Vogel Popcorn for 1975
under § 1561(a)(2).
27. Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'dper curiam, 548
F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). See infra notes 58-64 and accompany-
ing text.
28. 455 U.S. at 21.
29. Id
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controlled group and that the taxpayer was entitled to a full surtax ex-
emption and a refund for overpayment of taxes for the years in ques-
tion.3 0 Although noting that the regulation at issue was not "wholly
unreasonable" as a construction of the statute, the Court of Claims in-
validated the regulation to the extent that it considered, for purposes of
the eighty percent test, stock held by a shareholder owning stock in
only one corporation of an alleged controlled group.3'
Upon petition by the Commissioner, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.32 In a seven-two decision the Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Claims in favor of the taxpayer.33
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
A. The Legislative Origin of Section 1563
Of the numerous income tax advantages available to related cor-
porations that do not constitute a controlled group, the most significant
is that which was at issue in Vogel-the availability of multiple surtax
exemptions. For taxable years ending after 1974 and before 1979, a
corporation was entitled to a $50,000 surtax exemption.34 The surtax
rate of twenty-six percent applied only upon corporate taxable income
in excess of $50,000. 31 Thus, where total corporate taxable income ex-
ceeded $50,000, a significant tax savings could be achieved by employ-
30. 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
31. Id
32. 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
33. 455 U.S. at 35. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Jus-
tice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented.
34. Section 11(d) (1975).
For tax years ending before 1975, the first $25,000 of corporate earnings was exempted
from the federal surtax on corporate income. I.R.C. § 1 (d) (1970).
Although the Revenue Act of 1978 replaced the surtax exemption with a graduated five-
step rate structure for years ending after 1978 for the first $100,000 of corporate taxable
income, the progressive system of taxation has continued to provide incentive for abuse. See
supra note 3.
I.R.C. § 11(b) (1981) provides:
The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be the sum of-
(1) 15 percent (16 percent for taxable years beginning in 1982) of so much of the
taxable income as does not exceed $25,000;
(2) 18 percent (19 percent for taxable years beginning in 1982) of so much of the
taxable income as exceeds $25,000 but does not exceed $50,000;
(3) 30 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $50,000 but does not
exceed $75,000;
(4) 40 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $75,000 but does not
exceed $100,000; plus
(5) 46 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $100,000.
35. Section 11(d) (1975).
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ing multiple corporations.36
The surtax exemption was originally enacted in 1950 to reduce the
tax burden on small businesses.37 Soon thereafter, taxpayers began to
structure ownership of business entities to take advantage of the tax
reductions produced by operating in the multicorporate form.38 Prior
to 1964, the Commissioner's attack on such abuse was limited in that
the sole available remedy was a subjective case-by-case approach pro-
vided by sections 269, 482 and 1551.19 Of these, only section 1551 was
36. Under the $50,000 surtax exemption, the tax savings amounted to $13,500 for each
additional surtax exemption obtained through the use of multiple corporations.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1950).
38. The House Ways and Means Committee Report that addressed the problem in 1969
noted that
large organizations have been able to obtain substantial benefits. . . by dividing
the organization's income among a number of related corporations. Your commit-
tee does not believe that large organizations which operate through multiple corpo-
rations should be allowed to receive the substantial and unintended tax benefits
resulting from the multiple use of the surtax exemption and the other provisions of
present law.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 98, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1645, 1746-47. See also S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 134, reprintedin 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2166.
39. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 117, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1313, 1636.
Section 269 authorizes the Secretary to disallow a tax deduction, credit or other allow-
ance when an acquisition is made solely to avoid or evade federal income tax. See Slappey
Drive Industrial Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1977) (additional surtax ex-
emptions denied multiple real estate corporations selling adjoining vacant lands because tax
avoidance motive outweighed all other motives); Atlas Storage Co. v. United States, 437
F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1971) (multiple surtax exemptions denied storage corporations that were
owned by one stockholder and operated as a single entity; multiple corporations were
formed for the principal purpose of avoiding surtax by keeping net income of each corpora-
tion under $25,000); Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1969) (multiple
surtax exemption denied for separately incorporated citrus groves that were essentially a
single enterprise and formed for principal purpose of tax avoidance); Kessmar Constr. Co. v.
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1964) (multiple surtax exemptions denied where prin-
cipal purpose of shareholders in forming 16 corporations instead of one was evasion or
avoidance of income tax through securing of tax benefits which the stockholders otherwise
would not have enjoyed).
Section 482 authorizes the Secretary to reallocate income, deductions, credits or al-
lowances between or among taxpayers if such an allocation is necessary to prevent evasion
of taxes or clearly reflect income of taxpayers. Although § 482 may not be employed di-
rectly to disallow surtax exemptions (see Challenger, Inc., 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 2315 (1964)), a
reallocation under § 482 may have the same effect as a disallowance of the surtax exemp-
tion. (Assuming all of the income of two commonly controlled corporations is allocated
under § 482 to the first corporation, the second corporation will have no taxable income
from which to derive the benefit of the surtax exemption.) See Shaw Constr. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963) (income and expenses of 88 corporations formed by
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specifically aimed at multiple surtax exemptions.40 Each of these sec-
tions requires a showing of an improper tax motive on the part of the
taxpayer in its use of multiple corporations.41 Since taxpayers fre-
quently met the burden of showing valid nontax reasons for the use of
multiple corporations, these sections were virtually without effect.
4 2
Seeking to halt the proliferation of multiple corporations, the
Treasury Department persuaded Congress to limit the use of multiple
surtax exemptions by related corporations.43 A mechanical test of con-
trol and ownership under which motive was irrelevant was enacted as a
part of the Revenue Act of 1964, thus subrogating the subjective ap-
proach of sections 269, 482 and 1551." In sections 1561-1563 Congress
defined a "controlled group" of corporations and limited such groups
to a single surtax exemption.45 The exemption was to be allocated
among the members of the controlled group unless the group elected to
pay a six percent penalty per corporation for the privilege of claiming
the multiple surtax exemption.46 The statutory definition included two
shareholders of construction company allocated to the construction company because the
corporations did not serve a business purpose and were thus regarded as shams).
The § 1561 regulations note that the provisions of part II (§ 1561 and following), sub-
chapter B, chapter 6 of the Code, do not "delimit or abrogate any principal [sic] of law
established by judicial decision, or any existing provisions of the Code, such as sections 269,
482 and 155 1, which have the effect of preventing the avoidance or evasion of income taxes."
Treas. Reg. § 1.1561-1(b).
40. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 121(0, 65 Stat. 452, 468-69, as amended, I.R.C.
§ 1551 (1981).
Prior to 1964, § 1551 disallowed the surtax exemption and the accumulated earnings
credit to any corporation that transferred property (other than money) to another corpora-
tion created to receive the property, or not actively engaged in business at the time of the
transfer, if the corporations were under common control. The control test under this section
required that the transferor corporation (or its shareholders) own at least 80% of the voting
power or total value of the transferee corporation. This section was effective only if the
transferor corporation could not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a major
purpose of the transfer was not to obtain the exemption or credit. See Thomas, supra note
13, at 66-67.
41. See Thomas, supra note 13, at 66-67; White, supra note 13, at 1355-56 & n.14-16.
42. Id
43. See Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 159-61 (1963). In a 1963 tax message, President
Kennedy urged Congress to limit related groups to a single surtax exemption. The Treasury
adopted the President's suggestion in its proposal. Id at 36, 76-82, 158-83.
44. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19, 116-25 (current
version at I.R.C. § 1563(a)). See infra text accompanying note 48; supra note 39.
45. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19, 116-25.
46. Id (formerly codified at I.R.C. § 1562 (1964)). The stated purpose of the additional
tax was to decrease the incentive to use multiple surtax exemptions. See H.R. REP. No. 749,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 117, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1313, 1617.
Section 1562 was repealed by § 401(a)(2) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, 83 Stat. 487, 600.
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types of controlled groups-parent-subsidiary and brother-sister.47 As
originally enacted, section 1563 defined a brother-sister controlled
group as:
[t]wo or more corporations if stock possessing at least eighty
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or at least eighty percent of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of each of the corpora-
tions is owned. . . by one person who is an individual, estate,
or trust.
48
The 1964 legislation failed to curb the abuse of multiple corpora-
tions. The Treasury reported that although the 1964 legislation had
reduced the tax benefits available through the use of multiple corpora-
tions, the abuse had not been eliminated. 49 The eighty percent owner-
ship test was easily avoided by insuring that no single shareholder's
ownership interest was greater than or equal to eighty percent of more
than one corporation.5" In addition, the six percent elective penalty tax
had the unintended effect of encouraging corporations to claim multi-
ple surtax exemptions.5' In response to a Treasury proposal aimed at
the growing problem of abuse of the multicorporate device, Congress
adopted the present two-part test codified in section 1563(a)(2) as a part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.52
Sectioi 1563 as amended increased the number of shareholders
who may be considered for purposes of determining controlled group
47. See supra note 4.
48. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 19, 120 (1964) (amended
1969) (current version at I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1981)).
Congress amended § 1551 concurrently to extend to indirect transfers of property to a
controlled corporation and to transfers made by "five or fewer individuals who are in con-
trol of a corporation." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 116-23, 187-213, reprinted in
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1636; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 148-
55, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1673, 1829. The definition of control
under § 1551 is identical to that adopted by Congress in 1969 when it amended § 1563.
Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
91st Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 14, at 5168 (1969) (Technical Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform
Proposals) [hereinafter cited as Technical Explanation]. See generaly Thomas, supra note
13.
49. The Treasury Department reported that the number of corporations claiming multi-
ple surtax exemptions increased from 104,000 to 126,000 from 1964 to 1966. Hearings on the
Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 14, at 5387-88 (General Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform Proposals) [hereinaf-
ter cited as General Explanation].
50. General Explanation, supra note 49, at 5396.
51. See supra notes 46 and 49 and accompanying text.
52. See supra text accompanying note 11. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, § 401(c), 83 Stat. 602.
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status from one (as provided in the 1964 version of the statute) to "5 or
fewer."53 Thus, it is apparent that Congress was attempting to broaden
the reach of the statute in order to make it more difficult to evade the
control limitation.1
4
B. Judicial Application of the Eighty Percent Test
The proper application of the eighty percent test in section
1563(a)(2)(A) was the key question addressed by the Vogel Court. The
question raised by the statutory ambiguity is whether a person's stock-
holdings are to be taken into account for purposes of the eighty percent
test only if each individual owns an interest in each of the corporations
making up an alleged controlled group. The Treasury's interpretation
of the statute is that "'brother-sister controlled group' means two or
more corporations if the same five or fewer persons. . . own. . . singly
or in combination" stock that represents the two described percentages
of voting power or total value.
The focal point in Vogel was the Treasury's addition of the words
"singly or in combination, ' 56 an addition which had become the sub-
ject of exhaustive commentary and debate. Many critics considered the
regulation an improper expansion of the statute which was unsup-
ported by the legislation itself or by legislative intent.
5 7
The validity of the regulation first came before the courts in
Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner.8 In Fairfax, the Tax Court
invalidated the regulation after examining the language, legislative his-
tory and purpose of the statute and concluding that the regulation was
53. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401(c), 83 Stat. 602. See supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
54. See General Explanation, supra note 49, at 5394, 5396.
Expanding the 80-percent ownership test from one person to five will close the
present opportunity for easy avoidance of that 80-percent test. However, adding
the 50-percent identical ownership test will insure that the new expanded definition
is limited to cases where the brother-sister corporations are, in fact, controlled by
the group of shareholders as one economic enterprise.
Id at 5396.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1975) (emphasis added). See supra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
The Treasury Department issued temporary regulations in 1971. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 13.16-1(a), T.D. 7101, 1971-1 C.B. 269. Although commentators attacked these regulations
(see Kringel, supra note 13; Libin and Abramowitz, supra note 13), the wording remained
unchanged in the proposed and final regulations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), 36 Fed.
Reg. 17, 869 (1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972).
57. See Libin and Abramowitz, supra note 13, at 328.
58. 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'dper curiam, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977).
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"an unreasonable interpretation of the statutory language." 9 Reason-
ing that the function of the eighty percent test is to measure the
financial interest of those individuals who satisfy the fifty percent con-
trol test, the Tax Court majority argued that the regulation rendered
the eighty percent test meaningless.60 The effect of the Fairfax decision
was to impose a common ownership requirement for purposes of the
eighty percent test.
In contrast, the Fai7ax dissent concluded that the two tests were
independent. The dissent based its argument in support of the regula-
tion on the identical language relied on by the majority to invalidate
the regulation.6' Judge Simpson's dissent criticized the majority for
overlooking the "obvious meaning" of the statutory language, 62 and for
its attempt to define the application of the statute without authorization
in the language of the statute or legislative history.63 Judge Simpson
concluded:
59. 65 T.C. at 802.
60. Id at 805-06. The court stated:
[T]he 50-percent test is one of control, drawn to insure that the members of the
controlled group could be organized and operated as one corporation (citations
omitted). The 50-percent test being the control test, it is apparent that the 80-
percent test is one of financial interest. Together, the tests assure that the sanctions
imposed by section 1561 are applied only in those instances where the evil sought
to be remedied rears its head, i.e., where those in control of two or more corpora-
tions are utilizing the multicorporate form to obtain an unwarranted financial ben-
efit. To allow the 80-percent ownership test to be satisfied with stock of a person
owning stock in only one corporation, i.e., a person not within the control group,
would simply ignore the basic function of the 80-percent test.
61. Id at 809-10. Both opinions cited the same language of the General Explanation to
support their differing positions:
(2) Brother-sister groups.-A group of corporations in which five or fewer per-
sons own, to a large extent in identical proportions, at least 80 percent of the stock
of each of the corporations. . . .However, in order to insure that this expanded
definition. . . applies only to those cases where the five or fewer individuals hold
their 80 percent in a way which allows them to operate the corporations as one
economic entity, the proposal would add an additional rule that the ownership of
the five or fewer individuals must constitute more than 50 percent of the stock of
each corporation considering, in this test of ownership, stock of a particular person
only to the extent that it is owned identically with respect to each corporation.
General Explanation, supra note 49, at 5394.
The majority construed the terms "to a large extent in identical proportions" and "one
economic entity" to indicate that common ownership and control were the sine qua non of a
brother-sister controlled group. 65 T.C. at 805. The dissent, on the other hand, believed
that the same language made it "clear that different persons may be taken into consideration
in applying the 80-percent and the 50-percent tests and that the common ownership require-
ment is only applicable for purposes of the 50-percent test." 65 T.C. at 810. The dissent
interpreted the phrase "to a large extent in identical proportions" to "merely indicate that
there will be common ownership 'to a large extent' among those persons whose ownership is
considered for purposes of the 80-percent test." 65 T.C. at 810.
62. 65 T.C. at 811.
63. Id at 812.
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For my part, I cannot say that those provisions are arbitrary
or irrational, and as a court, it seems to me that we should
refrain from adopting an interpretation of them which will
limit their applicability. If the reach of the statute is too
broad, the remedy lies with Congress. Although some of my
colleagues may be firmly convinced that the statute should
have been written more narrowly, it is not for us to usurp the
policymaking responsibilities of the Congress.64
The opposing viewpoints set forth in Fairfax formed the basis of
the controversy which was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in
Vogel. Although the Tax Court remained firm in its position in subse-
quent cases in which it addressed the issue,65 three of the Circuit Courts
favored Judge Simpson's dissenting argument and reversed the Tax
Court to uphold the Commissioner's interpretation of the regulation.66
The Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's Fairfax decision in a per
curiam opinion which adopted Judge Simpson's dissenting opinion and
concluded that the dissent's interpretation "accords with the text of the
statute and its legislative history. '67 The Eighth and Second Circuits
followed suit in TL. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner6 and Allen Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 69 respectively. In TL. Hunt the court concluded that
"[t]he holding of the Tax Court in this case constitutes an unwarranted
addition to the statute of a requirement not reflected in the plain terms
and language of the statute."7 In Allen Oil the court upheld the regu-
lation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute and maintained that
the Tax Court's interjection of a common ownership requirement ren-
dered the fifty percent test superfluous.7
Taxpayer Vogel Fertilizer approached the Court of Claims as an
untested forum in the unsettled controversy which continued to loom
over the validity of the regulation.72 The Court of Claims upheld the
taxpayer's position and approved the Tax Court's statutory construc-
64. Id at 813.
65. See supra note 14.
66. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
67. 548 F.2d 501, 503 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
68. 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977).
69. 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980).
70. 562 F.2d at 535.
71. 614 F.2d at 339.
72. At the time of the taxpayer's decision to file its action with the Court of Claims,
appeals of decisions of that court could be taken only to the United States Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari or by certification of questions of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1255 (originally enacted
as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1255, 62 Stat. 928), repealed by Pub. L. 97-164, § 123, 96
Stat. 36 (1982).
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tion in Fairfax as "the most careful and best analysis of the statute to
date."73 The court acknowledged, however, the position of the Second,
Fourth and Eighth Circuits and admitted that "the different view taken
by Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3) is not wholly unreasonable as a con-
struction of the words appearing in section 1563(a)(2)." 74 The majority
further acknowledged that the statute has been "fairly criticized" as
being open to at least four possible interpretations.75 Nevertheless, the
court found the regulation "clearly inconsistent with the legislative his-
tory and unreasonable when the purpose, as well as the bare words, of
the statute are considered.
'7 6
Noting that the legislative history relied on by the majority to in-
validate the regulation can just as reasonably be read to support the
regulation, the Court of Claims dissent framed the issue succinctly:
"[T]he issue is not whether plaintiff's interpretation is as reasonable as
defendant's. .. [but] whether plaintiff has carried its heavy burden of
showing the regulation to be unreasonable and plainly inconsistent
with the statute. 77
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Brennan framed the issue before the Court as "whether the
regulatory interpretation . . . is a reasonable implementation of the
statute or whether Congress intended the statute to apply only where
each person whose stock is taken into account owns stock in each cor-
poration of the group." 78 The Court acknowledged that its role was
limited to a determination of the validity of the regulation and that
deference is ordinarily owed to the agency construction if "the regula-
tion 'implement[s] the congressional mandate in some reasonable man-
ner.' ,,79 The Court pointed out, however, that the general principle of
deference merely sets "'the framework for judicial analysis; it does not
displace it.' "80
The Court initially considered the weight to be accorded the inter-
pretive regulation. Treasury regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) was
73. 634 F.2d at 501.
74. Id at 503.
75. Id at 501. See Libin and Abramowitz, supra note 13, at 327-28.
76. 634 F.2d at 503.
77. Id at 514 (Smith, J., dissenting).
78. 455 U.S. at 19.
79. Id at 24 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
80. 455 U.S. at 24 (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)).
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promulgated under the general authority issued to the Secretary of the
Treasury by Congress to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations.",,1
As noted by the Court, an interpretive regulation is owed "'less defer-
ence than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to de-
fine a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory
provision.' ",2 According to the majority, the regulation "purports to
do no more than add a clarifying gloss on a term. . . that has already
been defined with considerable specificity by Congress,"83 and, as such
"[tlhe Commissioner's authority is consequently more circumscribed
than would be the case if Congress had used a term 'so general. . . as
to render an interpretive regulation appropriate.' "84
The Court then considered whether the regulation "harmonizes"
with the language and structure of the statute. The statutory language,
the Court declared, "while not completely unambiguous, is in closer
harmony with the taxpayer's interpretation than with the Commis-
sioner's Regulation." 85 According to the majority, the statutory lan-
guage itself suggests a common ownership requirement because the
term "brother-sister controlled group" infers "a close horizontal rela-
tionship between two or more corporations."8 6 The Court then con-
cluded that the structure of the statute strengthens this interpretation
and approved the Tax Court's analysis of the statutory language in
Fairfax 87
81. 455 U.S. at 24 (citing § 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code). The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue generally promulgates the rules and regulations with the approval of
the Secretary. Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1 (1975).
82. 455 U.S at 24 (quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)).
83. 455 U.S. at 24.
84. Id at 24-25 (citing National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
476 (1979), quoting Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939)).
85. 455 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
86. Id
87. Id & n.8. In Fairfax, the Tax Court determined that the phrase "five or fewer per-
sons" is the "conjunctive subject" of both the 80% and 50% tests:
If ownership of stock in each corporation involved is a precondition to membership
in the ownership group for purposes of the 50 percent test, and the ownership
groups for the 50 percent test and 80 percent test are one and the same, it follows
...that one must own stock in each corporation before his stock can be taken into
account for purposes of the 80 percent test.
65 T.C. at 803.
The Vogel majority agreed with the Tax Court's further conclusion that this interpreta-
tion is strengthened by the phrase "each such person":
The words 'each such person' appearing . . .[in the statute] refer to the 'five or
fewer persons' constituting the ownership group for purposes of both the 80 per-
cent and 50 percent tests. The import of such usage is that each person-and not
just some of the persons-counted for purposes of the 80 percent test must be also
counted for purposes of the 50 percent test.
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The Court noted that a regulation that is fundamentally at odds
with the statute's origin and purpose will not be sustained simply be-
cause it is not "technically inconsistent" with the language of the stat-
ute. Upon analyzing the regulation in light of the legislative history of
section 1563(a)(2), the Court concluded that "[t]he legislative history
...resolves any ambiguity in the statutory language and makes it
plain that... [the regulation] is not a reasonable statutory interpreta-
tion.""8 In reaching this conclusion the Court determined that "[t]he
intended targets of § 1563(a)(2) were groups of interrelated corpora-
tions ...characterized by common control and ownership."8 9 The
Court further concluded that the legislative history illustrates that the
eighty percent requirement was intended by Congress to remain the
primary basis for determining the interrelationship between two or
more corporations.90
To reach its conclusion the Court relied primarily upon the Treas-
ury's Technical and General Explanations of the 1969 Act.9 ' The fol-
lowing language from the Technical Explanation convinced the Court
that the Treasury had explicitly retained a common ownership require-
ment in the eighty percent test: "[T]he same five or fewer persons
[must] own at least 80 percent of the voting stock or value of shares of
each corporation, and . . . these five or fewer individuals" must also
satisfy the fifty percent requirement contained in part B of the statute.92
According to the majority, the General Explanation "made it
455 U.S. at 25-26 & n.8 (quoting Fairfax, 65 T.C. at 803).
The Vogel majority concluded that the presence of this clause strengthens "the sugges-
tion that there is one fixed, indivisible, group of shareholders whose holdings are to be con-
sidered throughout application of both [tests]." 455 U.S. at 25-26 n.8.
88. 455 U.S. at 26.
89. Id at 27. In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on a House Ways and Means
Committee Report which noted that
large organizations have been able to obtain substantial benefits ... by dividing
the organization's income among a number of related corporations. Your commit-
tee does not believe that large organizations which operate through multiple corpo-
rations should be allowed to receive the substantial and unintended tax benefits
resulting from the multiple use of the surtax exemption and the other provisions of
present law.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1, 98, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1645, 1746-47.
90. 455 U.S. at 27. The dissent labeled the majority's conclusion "entirely speculative"
as well as "entirely without support in the legislative history." According to the dissent, the
majority derived its conclusion from the fact that the Treasury had described § 1563(a)(2) as
an "expansion" of the pre-1969 statutory scheme which considered corporations to be part
of a controlled group only if the same person owned 80% of the stock in each corporation.
Id at 37 & n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. 455 U.S. at 28-29.
92. Id at 29. See Technical Explanation, supra note 48, at 5168.
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clear" that the eighty percent test would remain the key factor under
the 1969 amendment in determining whether corporations represent
the same financial interests.93 Based on the General Explanation, the
Court viewed the 1969 test as simply an "expansion" of the 1964 test,
"necessary to 'close the present opportunity for easy avoidance' of the
80-percent test." Because the ownership group had been expanded
from one to five persons, the fifty percent test was added to "'insure
that the new expanded definition is limited to cases where the brother-
sister corporations are, in fact, controlled by the group of stockholders
as one economic enterprise.' ,,94 The Court also noted that al examples
included in the Treasury's explanations indicated a common ownership
requirement for purposes of the eighty percent test. 95
The Court pointed out that although the Congressional under-
standing of what was enacted is ultimately controlling, "great weight"
attaches to agency representations to Congress when the agency has
participated in drafting and has voiced its views in committee hear-
ings.96 The majority took the position that the legislative history of the
statute confirms that Congress adopted not only the Treasury proposal,
but also the Treasury's explanation and interpretation, which the Court
viewed as "wholly incompatible" with the regulation. 97 The Court
found the Ways and Means Committee Report98 to include the Treas-
ury's explanations, and concluded that the eighty percent test is an ex-
panded version of the 1964 statute that measures overlapping interest,
while the fifty percent test is an additional provision necessitated by the
expanded number of shareholders. 99
According to the majority, the eighty percent test under the regula-
tion "measures only whether or not the brother-sister corporations are
closely held." The Court concluded that "[tihe fact that a corporation
is closely held, absent common ownership, is irrelevant to the congres-
sional purpose of identifying interrelationship."
100
93. 455 U.S. at 29.
94. Id at 29-30 (quoting General Explanation, supra note 49, at 5396; emphasis added
by Vogel majority).
95. 455 U.S. at 30 n.10.
96. Id at 31 (citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969)).
97. 455 U.S. at 31-32.
98. See supra note 38.
99. 455 U.S. at 32. The Court noted that the language of the Senate Committee Reports
is essentially identical to that employed by the House. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 135, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2167.
100. 455 U.S. at 30. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited with approval the state-
ment in Judge Webster's dissent in TL. Hunt: "It is not the smallness of the number of
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The Court briefly considered but was unpersuaded by three other
arguments advanced by the Commissioner:
(1) The Commissioner contended that because the 1969 amend-
ment of section 1563 contains language identical to that contained in
the previously enacted section 1551(b)(2),1°' Congress thereby ap-
proved and adopted the interpretation of that language set forth in the
regulations under section 1551.102 The Court dismissed this argument,
finding that the section 1551 regulations did not support the Commis-
sioner's position. 103
(2) The Court also rejected the Commissioner's contention that
Congress implicitly approved regulation section 1.1563-1 (a)(3) when it
incorporated by reference the section 1563(a) controlled group defini-
tions in section 1015 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). °4 The Court refused to apply the doctrine of statu-
tory re-enactment, reasoning that the "passing reference" to section
1563(a) in section 414(b), which was enacted only two years after the
regulation was promulgated, could not be said to constitute "legislative
approval of a long standing administrative interpretation" from which
congressional acceptance could be inferred. 0
(3) Finally, the Court disagreed with the Government's assertion
that the common-ownership requirement "leads to the assertedly non-
sensical result" that ownership of a single share could create a brother-
sister controlled group.10 6 The Government pointed out that if Crain
held so much as one share of Vogel Popcorn stock, section 1563(a)(2)
would apply under either interpretation of the statute. The Court re-
persons in each company that triggers § 1563; it is the sameness of that small number." T.L.
Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d at 537 (8th Cir. 1977) (Webster, J., dissenting).
101. See supra notes 40, 48 and 52.
102. 455 U.S. at 32-33. The Government focused on regulation § 1.1551-l(g)(4), Exam-
ple 4, to support its contention that the 80% test does not require common ownership, Id at
33 and n.13.
103. According to the Court, the example relied on defines "a concept [transfer] that obvi-
ously has no application under § 1563(a)(2)." Id The Court stated that even if it is as-
sumed that Congress was aware of the regulations under § 1551, those regulations do not
support the Commissioner's regulation under § 1563(a)(2) since they contain no language
similar to the words "singly or in combination" that appear in regulation § 1.1563- 1(a)(3).
The Court noted further that the regulations under § 1551 contain no suggestion that the
Treasury Department had ever interpreted § 155 l(b)(2) as not having a common ownership
requirement. Id at 33.
104. Id In dismissing this argument, the Court noted that the intent of the 1969 Congress
that amended § 1563(a) is controlling, not the intent of the Congress that enacted § 414 in
1974. Id at 34.
105. Id at 34.
106. Id
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jected the argument out of hand, pointing out that Congress had pur-
posefully substituted an objective test for the former subjective
approach. 107
B. The Dissent
Although Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the majority opin-
ion persuasively defended a possible interpretation of section
1563(a)(2), he objected to the majority's failure to establish the unrea-
sonableness of the Treasury's interpretation. 108 Because "the only cer-
tainty about the language and history of § 1563(a)(2) is that both are
ambiguous," Justice Blackmun would have deferred to the judgment of
the Commissioner. 10 9
Justice Blackmun attacked the majority's statement that the statu-
tory term "brother-sister controlled group" is in "closer harmony" with
the taxpayer's interpretation than with that of the regulation because of
the relationship connoted by the term. Noting that the statute is en-
tirely silent as to whether each member of the alleged controlled group
must own stock in each corporation, Justice Blackmun admitted his
own difficulty in inferring such a conclusion from a term that is "hardly
a household term with an intuitively obvious meaning."
1 0
Justice Blackmun also took issue with the majority's analysis of
the statutory structure. While the majority interpreted the phrase "5 or
fewer" as requiring the same shareholders to satisfy both the fifty per-
cent and eighty percent tests, the dissent construed the same phrase to
mean only that the total number of shareholders considered for both
tests may not exceed five.' Justice Blackmun argued that the pres-
ence of an explicit common ownership requirement in part B of the
statute, coupled with the absence of such a requirement in part A, indi-
cates that Congress did not intend to include a common ownership re-
107. Id The Court noted that "a sharp dividing line that is crossed by incremental
changes in ownership" is inherent in such a mechanical formula. Id According to the
majority, it is "obvious" that a shareholder would not acquire a small amount of stock in
order to create a controlled group of corporations. Id The Court concluded its analysis by
stating that "mere" ownership is an important aspect of the test because
[it] insures that each of the "5 or fewer" shareholders representing the bulk of the
financial interest of the corporations actually knows of the other corporations
within the putative brother-sister controlled group. Under this construction of the
statute, controlled-group membership cannot catch such a shareholder by surprise,
as it could under the Commissioner's construction. Id at 34-35.
108. 455 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id at 35-36 & n.l.
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quirement in the eighty percent test." t2 According to the dissent, a
"simpler and normal" reading of the statute supports the Commis-
sioner's interpretation, whereas the majority approach runs counter to
the statutory structure in that the fifty percent common ownership re-
quirement is swallowed by the eighty percent test.'"3
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's conclusion that the leg-
islative history resolves any ambiguity in the statutory language as
"substantially overstated."" 4 Furthermore, he found no support in the
legislative history for the Court's conclusion that Congress had in-
tended the eighty percent requirement to be the primary requirement
for determining the interrelationship between two or more
corporations." 
5
The dissent was also critical of the Court's heavy reliance on the
Treasury Department proposals, which were characterized as ambigu-
ous. According to Justice Blackmun, the Treasury Explanations need
not be read as requiring each individual to own stock in every corpora-
tion tested," 6 but could easily be construed to require only that a given
set of five satisfy both tests." 7 In light of these conflicting construc-
tions, Justice Blackmun found the majority's reliance on the proposals
to be ill-founded.
The dissent accused the majority of reading between the lines of
the statute, and thus "[losing] sight of the fact that certain statutory
ambiguities cannot be neatly and finally resolved."'"t 8 Although the
dissent did not take the position that the Commissioner's interpretation
is compelled by the legislative history, it concluded that the regulation
is not "'unreasonable or meaningless' [because] 'it insures that the
stock is closely held.' """ Because the regulation was not unreasona-
112. Id at 36 n.l.
113. Id at 36.
114. Id
115. Id at 37 & n.2. Noting the absence of any explicit statement in the legislative his-
tory regarding which test should serve as the primary test of interrelationship, the dissent
argued that the legislative materials are not inconsistent with the Commissioner's contrary
view that the 50% test was designed to serve as the test of interrelatedness. Id at 37 n.2.
116. Id at 37-39.
117. Id & n.3. The interpreted proposal declares that the 80% test "is satisfied if the
group of five or fewer persons as a whole owns at least 80 percent of the voting stock or
value of shares of each corporation, regardless of the size of the individual holdings of each
person." Technical Explanation, supra note 48, at 5169.
Justice Blackmun observed that during the course of litigation over the statute, both
taxpayers and the Government have drawn support from the same portions of the Treas-
ury's proposals. 455 U.S. at 38 n.3.
118. 455 U.S. at 39.
119. Id (citing Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d at 340).
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ble, the courts should refrain from interference: "'[tlhe choice among
reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts.' "120
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. The Commissioner's Regulation Was Not Unreasonable
The role of prescribing all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code was delegated by Congress
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not to the courts."2' This
delegation was designed to insure that the rules and regulations will be
written by the "masters of the subject" who will be administering those
rules and regulations. 2 2 Prior Supreme Court cases have established
the well-settled principle that Treasury regulations "must be sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue stat-
utes."'123 Treasury regulations are presumed valid if they "implement
the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." 2 4 When con-
fronted by a challenge to the validity of a regulation, the Court has
applied the following test:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries
out the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to
see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain lan-
guage of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation
may have particular force if it is a substantially contempora-
neous construction of the statute by those presumed to have
been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates
from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time
the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the
consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the de-
gree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during
subsequent re-enactments of the statute.
2-
120. 455 U.S. at 39 (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440
U.S. 472, 488 (1979)). See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
121. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1976).
122. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (cit-
ing United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1878)).
123. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
124. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
125. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (cit-
ing Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Helvering v. Win-
mill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)).
In upholding the regulation defining a "business league," the Court noted that although
the Commissioner's reading of § 501(c)(6) was perhaps not the only possible interpretation,
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The Vogel majority failed to establish that the Commissioner's
regulation is, in fact, "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" with the
statute. Both the language of the statute itself and the legislative his-
tory can be interpreted to support the Commissioner's regulation. Al-
though the language and legislative history can also be read to support
the majority's interpretation, neither mandates invalidation of the regu-
lation. Thus, as Justice Blackmun observed, the "'choice among rea-
sonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts.' ,126
1. Statutory language
The majority conceded that the language of the statute is not com-
pletely unambiguous, but considered that language to be in "closer har-
mony" with the interpretation of the taxpayer than with the
Commissioner's regulation.27 Although the statute is silent as to
whether each member of the set of five must own stock in each corpora-
tion tested, the majority found a common ownership requirement in
the statutory term "brother-sister controlled group."'' 28 The Court at-
tempted to find support for this position in the structure of the statute.
Relying on the approach of the Tax Court in Fairfax, the majority con-
cluded that because the phrase "5 or fewer persons" is the conjunctive
subject of both tests, the same persons must be taken into account in
each. 129 Furthermore, the Court determined that the phrase "each such
person" in the fifty percent test relates back to the words "5 or fewer
persons" to require each person counted for purposes of the eighty per-
cent test to be counted for the purposes of the fifty percent test as well.
The presence of this clause led the majority to conclude that the hold-
ings of one fixed, indivisible group of shareholders are to be considered
for purposes of both tests.'
30
The Court's construction of the statute is not necessarily evident
from the language of the statute. The Court simply assumed that the
term "brother-sister controlled group" connotes a close horizontal rela-
tionship between two or more corporations. 3' The dissent's observa-
tion that the "simpler and normal" reading of section 1563(a) would
"it does bear a fair relationship to the language of the statute, it reflects the views of those
who sought its enactment, and it matches the purpose they articulated." 440 U.S. at 484.
126. 455 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n,
Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. at 488).
127. 455 U.S. at 25.
128. Id
129. Id at 25-26 & n.8. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
130. Id at 25-26 & n.8.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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impose no common ownership condition upon the eighty percent test is
well-taken.13 z Had Congress intended to limit the eighty percent test to
situations in which each shareholder owns stock in each member of the
controlled group, it would have drafted an explicit provision such as
that contained in part B of the statute with respect to the fifty percent
test.
As noted by the dissent and the Second Circuit in Allen Oil, the
majority's reading of the statute renders the fifty percent test virtually
meaningless. 133 The Court of Claims reasoned that such an interpreta-
tion of the statute causes the fifty percent test to come into play only in
an "atypical" ownership arrangement. 34 For example, assume that the
stock of Corporation ABC is held eighty percent by Shareholder A and
twenty percent by Shareholder B; the stock of Corporation XYZ is held
eighty percent by Shareholder B and twenty percent by Shareholder A.
Although the eighty percent test is satisfied in this situation, the fifty
percent test is not and the corporations are not members of a brother-
sister controlled group. Thus, despite the fact that Congress intention-
ally designed a two-pronged test, the Court's interpretation has essen-
tially eliminated the applicability of the fifty percent test, except in
situations such as the above example. 35 This is contrary to the general
rule cited by the court in Allen Oil, that a statute must, if reasonably
possible, be construed "to give force and effect to each of its provisions
rather than render some of them meaningless."'1
36
Critics of the regulation have argued that the regulation virtually
eliminates the eighty percent test by focusing on the fifty percent test as
the primary determinant of control. '3  This criticism fails to take into
132. 455 U.S. at 36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id.; Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d at 339.
134. 634 F.2d at 502 & n.5. The Court of Claims conceded that under its interpretation,
application of the 50% test by itself would result in the exclusion of a group of corporations
from treatment as a brother-sister controlled group only in an "atypical" stock ownership
arrangement. The court took the position that the 50% test was designed precisely to exclude
such arrangements from treatment as a brother-sister controlled group. The Supreme Court
did not consider this point in its opinion.
135. This concern was brought to the attention of the Ninety-seventh Congress. The pro-
posal raised the question of whether the 50% identical ownership requirement continues to
have any significant, independent function under the Vogel common ownership require-
ment. H.R. 6725, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
136. Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing FTC v.
Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Blasius, 397
F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1008 (1969)).
137. This point is emphasized in Judge Webster's dissenting opinion in TL Hunt:
It is not the smallness of the number of persons in each company that triggers
§ 1563; it is the sameness of that small number. The 80 percent financial interest
requirement is meaningless unless it is the same group of five or fewer persons that
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account the fact that under the regulation the eighty percent test oper-
ates to insure that all members of the group will be closely held,
thereby facilitating operation as a single economic enterprise. As
stated by the Second Circuit in Allen Oil:
the 80% test is designed to assure that within the group of five
persons or fewer the overall control of or financial interest in
each of the corporations will beyond question be substantially
more than 50% (i.e., 80%, whereas the 50% test is intended to
assure that there will be a minimum commonality or commu-
nity of interest between members of the five or fewer persons
in control; otherwise there might be no tie between persons
controlling one corporation and those controlling another. 138
Under the Commissioner's approach, the eighty percent and fifty per-
cent tests each serve a distinct purpose and work in conjunction to
identify those entities under common ownership and control which
should be restricted to a single tax benefit.
On the other hand, the approach taken by the Court in Vogel as-
cribes both of these functions to the eighty percent test and relegates
the fifty percent test to the role of identifying the "atypical" ownership
situation. Without doubt, the language of section 1563(a)(2) may be
construed to support a number of interpretations, each of which will
necessarily cause one test to become subordinate to the other.139 Under
the Commissioner's interpretation, however, each part of the statute
has independent significance, yet both parts operate in concert to deter-
mine whether a controlled group exists.
2. Legislative history
In view of the ambiguity of the statutory language, the Court was
forced to examine the legislative history in its attempt to resolve the
conflict. Throughout the course of litigation over section 1563(a)(2),
courts have examined the same history and arrived at opposite conclu-
sions.14° Thus, the Court's conclusion that the legislative history re-
solved "any ambiguity in the statutory language" was an
overstatement; this history does not conclusively support either
interpretation.
own 80 per cent of each company within the controlled group. It is this require-
ment of "economic entity" which is entirely eviscerated by Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3).
562 F.2d at 537 (Webster, J., dissenting).
138. Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d at 340.
139. See Libin and Abramowitz, supra note 13, at 327-28.
140. See supra notes 14, 61 and 117 and accompanying text.
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In its 1969 proposal to Congress, the Treasury Department advo-
cated an expansion of the definition of a brother-sister controlled group
whereby the number of shareholders that could be considered in deter-
mining whether the eighty percent ownership test is satisfied was in-
creased from one to "five or fewer."14' The Treasury's proposal also
added the new fifty percent test which was explained as follows:
[I]n order to insure that this expanded definition of brother-
sister controlled group applies only to those cases where the
five or fewer individuals hold their eighty percent in a way
which allows them to operate the corporations as one eco-
nomic entity, the proposal would add an additional rule that
the ownership of the five or fewer individuals must constitute
more than fifty percent of the stock of each corporation, con-
sidering, in this test of ownership, stock of a particular person
only to the extent that it is owned identically with respect to
each corporation.'
42
The Senate and the House adopted the Treasury's proposed defini-
tion of a brother-sister controlled group without further explanation.
Neither the General Explanation nor the Technical Explanation relied
on by the Court addresses the question of whether the eighty percent
test requires common ownership. The Technical Explanation merely
states that the stock ownership test would be the same test employed in
section 1551 of the Code.
14 3
It is difficult to understand how the majority so readily concluded
that the General Explanation clearly establishes Congress' intent that
the eighty percent test remain the primary basis for determining
whether two or more corporations represent the same financial inter-
ests. 44 As noted by the dissent, this view is entirely without support in
the legislative history.' 45 Furthermore, the Treasury explanations may
also be interpreted to support the Commissioner's interpretation. The
relevant portion of the Technical Explanation states that the eighty per-
cent test "is satisfied if the group of five or fewer persons as a whole
owns at least 80 percent of the voting stock or value of shares of each
corporation, regardless of the size of the individual holdings of each
person."' 146  As Justice Blackmun pointed out, this statement "obvi-
141. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
142. General Explanation, supra note 49, at 5394.
143. Technical Explanation, supra note 48, at 5168.
144. 455 U.S. at 27.
145. Id at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying note 114.
146. Technical Explanation, supra note 48, at 5169 (emphasis added).
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ously suggests that the crucial inquiry is whether a given set of five
satisfies both tests, not whether each individual owns stock in each cor-
poration."' 147 The Vogel Court placed too much emphasis on ambigu-
ous legislative history that failed to yield any clear interpretation of the
statute.
3. Purpose of the statute
Congress amended the definition of a brother-sister controlled
group in 1969 upon determining that the eighty percent test as origi-
nally enacted in 1964 had failed to eliminate the abuse it was intended
to remedy. 148 Thus, in 1969 it was Congress' intent to expand the cir-
cumstances in which a group of related corporations would constitute a
controlled group. This goal was achieved by broadening the definition
of control by increasing the number of shareholders who may be con-
sidered in determining whether a controlled group exists from one to "5
or fewer." 149 Congress added the fifty percent identical ownership test
contained in part B of the statute to insure that the expanded definition
would apply to corporations operating as one economic entity. 50 The
majority's narrow interpretation thus runs counter to the overall statu-
tory scheme which Congress attempted to implement by broadening the
definition of control. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute, it is possible to avoid classification as a controlled group simply
by structuring stock ownership so that no member of a group of five or
fewer persons holds stock in every corporation of the group.' 5'
Critics of the regulation have argued that application of the Com-
147. 455 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. See supra text accompanying note 49; notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
151. For example, assume the following stock ownership pattern:
Individuals Corporations
A B C D E
I - 25 25 25 25
2 25 - 25 25 25
3 25 25 - 25 25
4 25 25 25 - 25
5 25 25 25 25 -
Under Vogel there are no controlled groups in the above pattern. With respect to any
two corporations the 50% test is met because three shareholders each hold 25% of both cor-
porations resulting in identical ownership of 75%. However, because the other two individu-
als own stock in only one of the two corporations tested the 80% test is not satisfied under the
Vogel common ownership requirement. Under the regulation, however, any combination of
two corporations would constitute a controlled group since the stock holdings of all five
individuals may be counted for purposes of the 80% test.
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missioner's interpretation of the regulation broadens the impact of the
statute substantially beyond the scope intended by Congress.152 It must
be remembered, however, that in amending section 1563 in 1969, Con-
gress expressly intended to expand the reach of the 1964 statute that
had failed to stop the proliferation pf multiple corporations. 153 The
Commissioner's regulation is not unreasonable in light of this overall
statutory scheme. Congress explicitly chose to make the rule applicable
to a greater number of situations by taking into account the stock own-
ership of up to five persons. Congress specifically added the fifty per-
cent test as a safeguard to insure that there would be common control
of each corporation by some members of the group. As set forth in the
General Explanation:
Expanding the 80-percent ownership test from one person
to five will close the present opportunity for easy avoidance of
that 80-percent test. However, adding the 50-percent identical
ownership test will insure that the new expanded definition is
limited to cases where the brother-sister corporations are, in
fact, controlled by the group of stockholders as one economic
enterprise.
154
The majority's interpretation of the statute substantially increases the
opportunity for easy avoidance of the eighty percent test-a result
which is contrary to the intent of both the Treasury and Congress to
close the loophole.
B. The Standard of Review
The majority recognized that the issue to be resolved was whether
the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.'-" That was
not, however, the issue the Court resolved. In holding for the taxpayer,
the majority concluded that the taxpayer's interpretation was in "closer
harmony" with the statute than that of the Commissioner. 5 6 Yet, the
Court failed to establish that the regulation was in fact an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute. Under the standard of review established
in previous cases, the regulation should have been upheld since it was
not shown to be an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. The
Court has repeatedly ruled that Treasury regulations are to be upheld if
they are not plainly inconsistent with the statute and if they implement
152. See supra note 13.
153. See supra note 38.
154. General Explanation, supra note 49, at 5396.
155. 455 U.S. at 24.
156. Id. at 25.
19831
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the statute in a reasonable manner. 57 As the Court explained in United
States v. Correll:
Alternatives. . . are of course available. Improvements
might be imagined. But we do not sit as a committee of revi-
sion to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress
has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task
of prescribing "all needful rules and regulations for the en-
forcement" of the Internal Revenue Code. . . . The role of
the judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with assur-
ing that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his author-
ity to implement the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner.
58
Thus, it was not open to the Supreme Court in Vogel to determine
whether the taxpayer and the Court of Claims had advanced a more
reasonable interpretation of the statute than had the Commissioner.
The Vogel Court noted that an interpretive regulation is appropri-
ate to define a general term used by Congress, which lacks a well-de-
fined meaning or common usage. In contrast, the Court observed, the
Commissioner's authority is substantially circumscribed when an inter-
pretive regulation adds no more than a "clarifying gloss" on a term
well-defined by Congress in the statute itself.5 9 As such, the Court
diminished the weight to be accorded interpretive regulations that
merely clarify a term defined by the perimeters of the statute. Al-
though the term "brother-sister controlled group" was in fact defined
with "considerable specificity" by Congress, 60 the definition was suffi-
ciently ambiguous to make an interpretive regulation appropriate.
Thus, the "clarifying gloss" added by the Commissioner was not only
reasonable, but also necessary to implement the Congressional
mandate.
The legislative history relied on by the Court to clarify the statu-
tory ambiguity is itself unquestionably ambiguous and may be con-
strued to support either of the conflicting interpretations. However, the
Court ignored the underlying purpose of the 1969 legislation which was
to expand the reach of the statute in order to halt the proliferation of
157. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Bingler v. John-
son, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978); Na-
tional Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Commissioner v.
Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 123 and 124.
158. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967).
159. 455 U.S. at 24 (citing National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
476).
160. 455 U.S. at 24.
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multiple corporations. Viewed in this context, the regulation harmo-
nizes with the statute's origin and purpose and is not an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute.
There is no indication in the majority opinion that the Court in-
tended to change the standard of review of interpretive regulations. It
appears, however, that the Court failed to apply its long-standing rule
that an interpretive regulation need only be a reasonable interpretation
of the statute. 16 1 In so doing, the Court has arguably heightened the
standard of reasonableness that must be met by interpretive regula-
tions, thereby potentially encouraging future taxpayer suits challenging
the validity of Treasury regulations, and increasing the likelihood of
their success.
C Consequences of the Decision
Congress enacted section 1563(a)(2) in response to a specific prob-
lem: its purpose was to prevent large companies from subdividing into
smaller entities in order to obtain multiple surtax exemptions. 62 As a
result of the Vogel decision, multiple surtax exemptions and other ben-
efits of multiple incorporation will be easier to obtain than under the
invalidated regulation. For example, assume that individual X owns a
business that operates in ten separate geographic locations. Vogel per-
mits X to create ten separate corporations and obtain a surtax exemp-
tion for each by structuring the stock ownership so that X retains as
much as seventy-nine percent of the stock of nine of the corporations
and 100% of the remaining corporation, with the remaining twenty-one
percent in each of the nine corporations being owned individually by
each of nine unrelated shareholders. None of these corporations will
constitute a brother-sister controlled group because each of the minor-
ity shareholders holds stock in only one of the corporations. Using
Vogel's common ownership requirement, only X's stock is counted for
purposes of the eighty percent test. Under the Commissioner's regula-
tion, however, in order to avoid classification as a controlled group, X's
ownership would be limited to no more than fifty percent of nine of the
corporations. Under the Commissioner's regulation, this ownership
pattern would constitute a brother-sister controlled group: the eighty
percent test would be satisfied because the group of five or fewer per-
sons owns eighty percent of each corporation; the fifty percent test
161. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
162. See supra note 38.
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would be satisfied by X's identical ownership of more than fifty percent
of two or more corporations.
Thus, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute permits X
to own as much as seventy-nine percent of the other nine corporations,
whereas the regulation would limit X's ownership to no more than fifty
percent. This twenty-nine percent difference in stock ownership is
likely to have significant ramifications. X will be more likely to use the
multicorporate structure if able to retain seventy-nine percent of the
stock in each corporation than if forced to relinquish an additional
twenty-nine percent to obtain the benefits of multiple incorporation.
The twenty-nine percent difference is even more significant in the
context of corporate control. The invalidated regulation, which re-
quired X to relinquish ownership of fifty percent of nine of the corpora-
tions to obtain the tax benefits of multiple incorporation, also required
X to relinquish voting control of those corporations. Because Vogel
permits X to retain seventy-nine percent of the stock without being
classified as a controlled group, X need no longer choose between con-
trol and tax benefits; both may be retained. Moreover, in states where
cumulative voting is mandatory, if the board of directors consists of
three or fewer directors, the twenty-one percent shareholder will be un-
able to elect even a single director unless permitted to do so by X.
163 X
could elect the same three individuals to the board of each of the ten
corporations and manage the corporations as a single integrated entity.
Although Vogel's primary effect is to increase the availability of
multiple surtax exemptions, the Court's decision allows corporations
that avoid controlled group classification to reap other tax benefits as
well.'64 Perhaps the most significant of these benefits is the opportunity
to exclude employees from coverage in qualified retirement plans. Sec-
tion 414(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that employees of
corporations that are members of a controlled group as defined by sec-
tion 1563 must be treated as if employed by a single employer. Thus,
all such employees must be considered in analyzing whether the cover-
age and anti-discrimination rules have been satisfied. 65 In the hypo-
thetical example considered above, one of the corporations that
163. Section 708 of the California Corporations Code (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) provides
that directors shall be elected by cumulative voting.
The percentage of ownership necessary to elect one director can be calculated under the
following formula:
100 +1, where x equals the number of directors to be elected.
x+I
164. See supra note 22.
165. I.R.C. §§ 401 and 410 (1981).
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employs X could adopt a retirement plan that covers only the employ-
ees of that corporation. Because the corporations do not constitute a
controlled group under Vogel, the employees of the remaining nine
corporations need not be covered by the plan. This allows X to provide
significant pension benefits for himself or herself while holding to a
minimum the cost of providing benefits to the remaining employees.
166
The Court's narrow interpretation of the controlled group defini-
tion could result in proliferation of multicorporate entities to such an
extent that the Commissioner, to protect the fisc, may be forced to re-
sort to the subjective tests employed prior to the enactment of section
1563.167 This would be ironic in view of the fact that the mechanical
tests embodied in section 1563 were enacted specifically to replace these
inadequate subjective tests.
As a result of the Vogel decision taxpayers who were considered
members of a controlled group under the regulation may file amended
returns for open taxable years to obtain a tax refund. Taxpayers will
find it easier to avoid controlled group status with relatively minor re-
structuring of stock ownership. A further, and perhaps more impor-
tant, consequence of the decision may be that taxpayers will attempt to
invalidate other regulations by offering a "more reasonable" interpreta-
tion of the statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
The applications of the controlled group test urged by the Treas-
ury and adopted by the Supreme Court in Vogel are at opposite ends of
the spectrum. Under the interpretation adopted in Vogel, a brother-
sister controlled group of corporations will exist in only the narrowest
of circumstances. Thus, the Supreme Court has frustrated Congress'
1969 efforts to curb the abuse of multiple corporations by broadening
the reach of the statute.
The Court's attempt to read between the lines of ambiguous legis-
166. Id at § 414(m) (1981). This section was added to the Code in 1980 by Pub. L. No.
96-605, § 201, 94 Stat. 3521, 3526, and provides that the employees of all corporations within
an "affiliated service group" must be treated as though employed by a single employer for
purposes of measuring compliance with the coverage and anti-discrimination rules con-
tained in §§ 401 and 410. The corporations referred to in the example in the text could
constitute an affiliated service group if the corporation that employs X provides X's services
to any of the other corporations. An analysis of § 414(m) is beyond the scope of this note.
For a more in-depth discussion see generally Schiffmacher, Stiglitz and Furst, QualifiedPlan
for Closely Held Businesses-Pension Plans as Tax Shelters, 33 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE (MAJOR TAX PLANNING): 1981 S. Calif. Inst. 1 300.
167. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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lative history led to a result that is inconsistent with the policy inherent
in section 1563: limitation of tax benefits available to multiple corpora-
tions. In view of the ambiguity of both the statutory language and the
legislative history, the Court should have deferred to the judgment of
the Commissioner since the regulation is neither unreasonable nor
plainly inconsistent with the statute. Because the Court's decision will
have an impact beyond the precise issue addressed in Vogel and will
often produce results that are inconsistent with the policy of limiting
the tax benefits available to multiple corporations, Congress should
once again amend section 1563 to remove the common ownership re-
quirement imposed by Vogel.
M. Katharine Davidson
